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Abstract
This paper reviews procedures for computing saddle points of continuous
concave-convex functions defined on polyhedra and investigates how certain
parameters and payoff functions influence equilibrium solutions. The discussion
centers on two widely-studied applications: missile defense and market share
attraction games. In both settings, each player allocates a limited resource,
called effort, among a finite number of alternatives. Equilibrium solutions to
these two-person games are particularly easy to compute either in closed form or
in a finite number of steps. One of the more interesting qualitative properties we
establish is the identification of conditions under which the maximizing player
ignores the values of the alternatives when making its allocation decisions.

Finding Saddle Points on Polyhedra:
Solving Certain Continuous Minimax Problems
George E. Monahan
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
1 Introduction
Consider the following constant-sum, two-person game. Two competitors, Player X and
Player Y, allocate a single resource, called effort, among n independent alternatives. The
value of the zth alternative is V{
€
R = ( — 00, +00) and is assumed to be constant with
respect to allocations made by either player. Effort allocations, therefore, determine only
the apportionment of v
t
among the competitors. In general, there are restrictions on the
allocations that each competitor can make. Here we assume these restrictions can be ex-
pressed in terms of linear inequalities. Let X = (xi, . .
.
, x n )
T and Y = (3/1, ... , yn )T , where
x t-, yi G R+ = [0, 00), i = 1, . . . ,rc, denote the allocations made by Player X and Player Y,
respectively. (Here, T denotes matrix transpose.) Let Qx = {X | X = (xi, . . . ,xn )T , AX <
a, x, > 0, i = l,...,ra} and Oy = {Y|Y = (yu . . . ,yn ) r , BY < b, y{ > 0, i = 1 n)
denote the sets of feasible allocations for Player X and Player Y, respectively. Here A and
B are mi x n and rri2 x n matrices and a = (ai, . .
.
, ami )
T and b = (61, . .
.
, bm2 )
T
are mi and
77?2 vectors, respectively. We assume that both Q,\ and Qy are bounded. Let Z = fl\ x ^r-
Suppose that F : Z —> R is a continuous, differentiate function that specifies the payoff to
Player X when the allocations by the respective players are X and Y, for (X, Y) £ Z. Un-
der the constant-sum assumption, the payoff to Player Y is the residual, Ya=\ v i ~ ^(X, Y).
Assume that for all Y
€ Qy, f(',Y) is concave and that for all X G Q,x, ^(X, •) is convex.
Danskin [8] refers to problems that have this structure as finite allocation games.
The saddle point problem is to find a pair, say (X*,Y*) £ Z, such that, for any (X, Y) £
Z, the following saddle point inequality is satisfied:
F(X,Y*) < F{X m ,Y m ) < F(X*,Y). (1)
Any (X*, Y*) G Z satisfying (1) is called a saddle (or Nash equilibrium) point on Z.
Since F is continuous on Z, concave on the compact set Q^, and convex on the compact
set Qy, a pure (non-randomized) equilibrium point on Z exists. For a discussion of the
existence of equilibrium points under a variety of conditions (some of which are weaker than
those imposed here), see Radzik [17].
There are two primary objectives to this paper. The first is to review procedures for
computing saddle points of continuous concave-convex functions defined on polyhedra, such
as Z. Models of this type are used in a variety of game-theoretic applications. In these
applications, a functional relationship between decisions made by competitors and payoffs
accruing to each competitor is specified. Furthermore, the effectiveness of effort allocations
are typically captured by one or more parameters in the model. The second objective of this
paper is to say something about how equilibrium solutions depend upon both the form of
the payoff function and the specific values of these effectiveness parameters.
In Section 2, we begin the analysis of continuous saddle point problems by examining an
early application of finite allocation games to problems dealing with ballistic missile defense.
In this setting, alternatives correspond to targets. The determination of saddle points in
these applications are particularly tractable under certain conditions. We show that when
the effectiveness of the effort expended on a target by one competitor is proportional to
the effectiveness of the opponent's effort allocated to that target, equilibrium points can be
computed in a finite number of steps. We also show that the optimal allocation of effort
to each target is independent of the proportionality constant and that the allocations made
on one of the players is (conditionally) independent of the value of the target. We use the
resulting algorithm to recompute the solution to an example given by Croucher [6] that
contains several errors.
In Section 3, we present a market share attraction model that is prominent in the opera-
tions research, economics, and marketing literature. This model is structurally quite similar
to the missile-defense model, with the only difference being the form of the payoff func-
tion. When the effectiveness of effort parameter (called the attraction elasticity of effort)
is constant across markets, saddle points can be expressed as closed-form functions of the
parameters of the model. We again examine the proportional-effectiveness case, see how
the proportionality constant influences the equilibrium effort allocations in this setting, and
compare these results to their missile-defense counterparts.
The efficient solution procedures in each of these applications depends in a critical manner
on the parametric requirement that either the effectiveness of effort is proportional or that
attraction elasticity is constant across markets. When these relationships do not hold, the
saddle point problem persists but the special-purpose solution techniques can no longer be
applied. Fortunately, more general solution procedures are available. While these procedures
are not discussed in detail here, Section 4 provides a guide to the relevant literature.
1.1 Related Literature
The computation of saddle points of continuous concave-convex functions has been widely
studied in a variety of settings in the operations research literature. The monograph by
Dem'yanov and Malozemov [11], for example, contains over 50 references to work published
(mostly in the Soviet Union) prior to 1972. Much of the work published in the West deals
with the solution of mathematical games of warfare—models dealing with the deployment
of missiles and the structure of defenses against enemy attacks. See, for example, the early
monograph by Danskin [8] and the papers by Bracken and McGill [1,2,3,4] and Croucher
[6,7].
In general, the computation of saddle points of concave-convex functions can be cast as
a more-or-less standard problem in nonlinear programming. See, for example Dem'yanov
and Pevnyi [9], Dem'yanov [10], and Dem'yanov and Malozemov [11]. Techniques such as
gradient projection (Rosen [18]) and interior penalty functions (Sasai [19]) can be used to
calculate (approximate) equilibrium points.
There is a related literature dealing with the computation of solutions to max-min and
min-max problems. A max-min (min-max) problem is a two-person game where the mini-
mizing (maximizing) player gets to move last after observing the strategy of the opponent.
In the two-person games we consider,
max min FIX, Y) = min max F(X.Y), (2)
A'eftx^efiy- Kefir A'efix
so that the order of play is irrelevant and is typically assumed to be simultaneous. (The
fact that (2) is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a saddle point on Z is called the
minimax (or saddle point) theorem; see, Dem'yanov and Malozemov [11, Lemma 6.1, page
222].) When one of the players is allowed to observe the action of the competitor and is
permitted a final move, the equality in (2) generally does not hold.
The solution of min-max and max-min problems are complicated by the fact that saddle
points may not exist; see Danskin [8] for a discussion of this issue. Pearsall [15] develops a
double Lagrangian procedure for computing solutions to min-max problems.
Some saddle point problems possess payoff functions with special structure which, in
conjunction with certain forms of restrictions on allocations, enables equilibrium points to be
determined exactly
,
either in closed form (Monahan [13]) or by using finite-step algorithms
(Croucher [6,7]).
We begin the analysis of continuous saddle point problems by examining an early appli-
cation in missile defense.
2 Missile Defense Games
Consider the following two-player game:
n
max min V ViPi(xi,yi) (3)
X\ ,...,Xn J/1 .•••,J/n .
1= 1
subject to
t=i
n
E» = B* (4)
1=1
aft, y% > o
where V{ > is the value of the z'th alternative, i = 1, . .
.
, n. The following forms of pi(x{, yi)
appear in the literature:
Pi(xi,y { ) - [1 -exp(-/?t-a:i)]exp(-a#i) (5)
Pi{xi,Vi) = x t exp(-aiyi) (6)
Pi(xi,yi) = 1 -exp( -/?,•£,•/ (1 + or.-y,-)), (7)
The interpretation of p,-( a: ,-,?/,•) is context-specific. Danskin suggests that (6) represents
the residual quantity of the ith weapon system whose initial size is x t that is attacked by
yi units of "counterforce'" effort. In Croucher [6] and [7], (5) and (7), respectively, represent
the probability that the ith target is destroyed by an attacker who allocates X{ units of force
when it is defended by yi units of force.
Danskin [8] analyzes the game that uses (6) and proposes the game that uses (5) in end-
of-chapter exercises. Croucher [6] analyzes the game that uses (5), employing the techniques
suggested by Danskin. Croucher [7] applies the same form of analysis to the game that uses
(7), with the added restriction that Bx < 2/max t 6 t .
Note that the equations representing the total amount of offensive and defensive effort
that is available to each player can be written as weak inequalities since the stipulation
that v
t
> for all i guarantees that it is always optimal for each player to expend all of
its resources. Therefore, the inequality constraints will always be binding at an equilibrium
solution.
The parameters a, > and /?,- > reflect the effectiveness of effort expended by Player
X and Player Y, respectively. It is easy to verify that p,-(x,-,y,-) increases as /?, increases and
decreases as a
z
increases, for fixed values of x
t
and y,-. Therefore, we say that the effort
allocated by Player X to alternative i is more effective at (3[ than at ft" if f3[ > (3". The same
reasoning applies to the rival: Player Y's effectiveness of effort increases with a,-.
The following characteristics of the optimal solution to (3) will not only be algorithmically
useful but will lend economic insight into the nature of the equilibrium. These results were
first suggested by Danskin [8] and were later reported and used by Croucher [6] and [7]; see
Danskin [8, Chapter II] for the development leading to the results summarized below. We
show the analysis for the problem that uses (5). The analysis of games the use either (6) or
(7) are analogous.
Let A and // denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with Player X's and Y's budget
constraint, respectively, tinder the condition that all effort is expended by both players, it is
easily shown that A > and \l > 0. Let X* = {x\, . .
.
, x* )
T and Y* = (yj y*)T denote
an equilibrium solution to (3).
The first result summarizes Exercises 5-7 in Danskin [8, Page 18] and is restated as
Lemma 7 in Croucher [6].
Proposition 2.1 Fori — 1,. . .,n,
a. x~ = y* = if and only if < u, < A//?,-
b. x* > and y* = if and only if A/ 3t < i\ < ///a,- + A//?t-
c. x* > and y* > if and only if v t > ///a, + A //?,-.
From Proposition 2.1, we see that /i/a, + A/$ is the "hurdle rate' 1 that determines if
Player Y-allocates positive effort to alternative i. The hurdle rate for Player Y is larger
than A//9,-, the hurdle rate for Player X; put differently, if Player Y allocates any effort to
a alternative, then Player X also allocates positive effort. The criterion used by Player X
to determine if effort should optimally be allocated to alternative i is j3t Vi > A and depends
upon the value of the alternative, the effectiveness of effort allocated to that alternative, and
the player's multiplier (i.e., the marginal value generated by the last unit of the budget).
The criterion for Player Y depends upon the effectiveness parameters of both players, the
value of the alternative, and both multipliers.
The next result gives the value of the optimal allocations in terms of the Lagrange
multipliers. This result is Exercise 6 in Chapter II in Danskin [8] and is restated by Croucher
[6] as Lemmas 4 and 5.
Proposition 2.2 For iI = 1, . .
.
, n
a. if x* > and y* > 0, then
xj = i-lnKAQi + M-J/AQ,-] (8)
Pi
y* = -ln[at-M/(Aat +M)]. (9)
a,
b. if x* > and y* = 0, then
x; = j\n(v
tpt /\). (10)
In light of this result, the optimal solution is completely determined once A and fi are
computed.
Let
I2 = {{ :x*>0 and y* > 0} and h = {i : x* > and y* = 0}. (11)
Then, using (8)—(10), the value of the game V = £?-i Vipi(x*,y*), is
v = ?E±: + zL-j), d2)
which corrects a typographical error in Croucher [6] (equation (8) on page 201, which is
unnumbered but is referenced on page 202).
In the next subsection, an algorithm that computes equilibrium strategies in a finite
number of steps is given. The properties given in Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 are exploited for
the special case where the measures of effectiveness, a t and /?,-, are proportional.
2.1 Proportional Effectiveness
In this section, assume that a t = kfr, i = l,...,n, for some fixed number k > 0. The
reasonableness of this restriction depends upon the setting. The numerical examples in
Croucher [6] and [7] satisfy this condition with k = 1. The restriction does permit differences
in effectiveness of effort among the two competitors, but these differences are in some sense
uniform across alternatives.
With this restriction on the parameters, there is a simple procedure for computing an
equilibrium. The algorithm given below is based on a procedure reported in Croucher[6] for
k = 1 (equal effectiveness). Here we formalize that procedure and make it general enough
to accommodate any value of k.
When a 2 = fc/?,-, the criterion for allocating positive effort by Player X is a{V t > \k and
for Player Y is a{V t > \k + fi. For notational convenience, let a = \k -\- (.i.
It will be convenient to express the index sets I\ and I2, defined in (11), in terms of the
Lagrange multipliers and parameters of the problem:
I1 = {i
I
\k < ot{Vi < <7, i = 1, . . . ,n} and I2 = {i \ oc{V{ > a, 1' = 1, . .
.
, n}.
Player Y only allocates positive effort for alternatives whose indices are in 72 • From (9) and
(8), we have
, \n(a l v l /(j) , k\n{cr/Xk)
y t = and x { = , (13)
for i G /2 . Therefore,
Player X allocates positive effort only for alternatives either in I\ or I2. From (10),
* Hn(<w/Afc)
,
x
{
= and y t = (15)
a t
for i
€
I\. Therefore,
£ -\n(aiVi/Xk) + £ -\n(<r/\k) = Bx . (16)
Tf Oil w Oil
It will be convenient in the sequel to solve (14) for <7, as follows:
a = exp
^2 — ln(a,-u t-) - Byw Oil /Er}-i€l2 l
Similarly, solving (16) for Xk yields
Xk = exp Y, -M^) + \n(*)J2 ~ ~ Bx /k / £ ;M-
i€/iU/2 Qt
A (simple) eleven step procedure for computing A A;, //, x", and y* for all z is now given.
For convenience and with no loss in generality, label the n alternatives so that ct\V\ > a2 v2 >
• • • > anvn , so that I2 is an initial substring of (1, . . . ,n), followed by I\. The algorithm is
based upon two observations:
1. If i G I2 , then i— 1 G ^2- To see this, suppose that i — 1 ^ I2 . Then a,_iVi_i < cr < a,r;,-,
which contradicts the ordering of the QjVj values. Therefore, I2 — {1, . . . ,j}, for some
positive integer j < n. The fact that j > 1 is necessary since Player Y must allocate
positive effort to at least one alternative.
2. If i G /1, then i — I G h for j + 2 < z < n. To see this, suppose that e G I\ and
z — 1 ^ /1. Then exactly one of two conditions must hold-either a^iVi-i > <j, which
contradicts the fact that at_iU,_i < aJ+1 i;J+1 < cr or ai_iv,_i < A A;, which contradicts
the fact that at-_iVj_i > ajU, > AA:. Therefore, /1 = or Ix = {j + 1, . . . ,ra}, for some
positive integer m < n.
These observations simplify the identification of the subsets {l,...,n} that constitute
both I\ and I2 . Indeed, one way to solve the problem is to enumerate all of the subsets
of the these integers that might possibly constitute I\ and I2 . Even for modest values of
n, this procedure becomes cumbersome, however. The construction of I\ and I2 suggested
in the Proportional Effectiveness Algorithm circumvents the necessity of doing a compete
enumeration and is therefore highly efficient.
The algorithm proceeds in the following manner. In Steps 1-4, cr is computed and I2 is
determined. In Steps 5-10, Xk is computed and I\ is determined. The optimal strategies are
then directly computable from the formulas in Propositions 2.1 and 2.2.
Let (7j be the value of a when I2 = {l,...,j} and Xm be the value of A when Ii =
{j + l,...,m} and I2 = {1,...,;}.
Proportional Effectiveness Algorithm
1. Set j = 0.
2. Increment j by 1. If j > n, go to Step 5; otherwise, set I2 = {1, . .
. , j} and compute
a = aj using (17).
3. If ctjVj > (Jj, go to Step 2; otherwise, set j to j — 1.
4. Set cr to a3 and 72 = { 1 ,-•••> j }
•
5. Set m to j. If m < n — 1, go to Step 7.
6. Set I\ = 0, and let
\k = exp ln(<7)£ -"A*/*
t€/2
a
t
/E- ;
«6/2
go to Step 11,
7. Increment m by 1. If m > n, go to Step 10; otherwise, set I\ = {j + 1, • • • , m} and
compute Am A: using (18).
8. If Xm k > am um and m. = j + 1, go to Step 6.
9. If Xmk < am vm , go to Step 7.
10. Set m to m — 1, set /i = {j + 1, . . . , m}, and set A£ to \m k.
11. Set i_i = a — \k. Stop.
The following notes explain in more detail what is being done in the algorithm.
1. In Steps 2-4, the objective is to find an index j such that g3 < oc3 Vj and aJ+x >
otj+iVj+i. This index j defines I2 and a = (jy
2. With a and I2 both determined, the associated y* are computable, using (13).
3. If the index j, determined in Steps 2-4, is equal to n, then I\ is empty. In this case,
the formula for \k, given in (18), simplifies to the expression given in Step 6.
4. In Steps 7-10, \k and I\ are determined when I\ is not empty. The objective is to find
an index m, such that Am & < am i;m and Am+1 A: > am +it>TO +i- This index m defines I\
and A A' = \m k.
i OLi v { x* y*
1 0.20 70 10.50 4.66
2 0.30 80 7.00 4.90
3 0.20 100 10.50 6.44
Table 1: A Numerical Example
5. With both \k and a determined, // is computed in Step 11. The associated x* are
determined using (13) and (15).
The algorithm was tested on the numerical example in Croucher [6] , which contains a
number of typographical and computational errors. A solution to the problem is given in
Table 1 and corrects the solution given in Table 1 in Croucher [6]. In this example, k = 1,
Bx = 28, and By = 16.
The value of the game V, A, and fi are also incorrectly reported in Croucher [6]. The
correct values are V = 64.53, A = 0.675 and fi = 4.84.
If the value of alternative 3 is changed to v3 — 250, the optimal allocations for Player Y
are y\ = 2.94, y\ = 3.76, and y^ = 9.30, which are the same as those reported by Croucher
[6]. The optimal allocations by Player X are those reported in Table 1 here and differ from
those in Croucher [6].
In the next subsection, some qualitative characteristics of "proportional effectiveness"
equilibrium strategies are discussed.
2.2 Qualitative Properties of Equilibrium Solutions
The first result describes the dependence of Player X's and Y's optimal allocations on the
parameter k. We wish to determine, for example, how the optimal allocations to alternative
i differ if Player X is ten times as effective as Player Y (i.e., a t = 0.1$) versus the situation
where Player Y is ten times as effective as Player X (i.e., a, = 10$).
First, a preliminary result.
Lemma 2.1 cr, given in (17), is constant with respect to k.
Proof The construction of I2 in Steps 2-4 of the Proportional Effectiveness Algorithm
depends only on the alternative-specific values of a,-, u;, and is independent of k. Therefore,
10
a is also independent of k.
Recall that a = Xk + fi and therefore k appears in the definition of the set I2 . Lemma
2.1 highlights the fact, however, that k does not influence the magnitude of a but only
determines its composition. The notation a = Xk + // gives a somewhat distorted view of
cr's "dependence" on k, since both X and // also depend upon k.
Lemma 2.1 leads readily to the first characterization result.
Proposition 2.3 a. y* is independent of k for all i.
b. If y* > for all i, then x* is independent of both k and u, for all i.
Proof When a t = kj3{, the formulas for the optimal allocations to alternative i, (8) and
(9), reduce to the expressions in (13) and (15).
That y* is independent of k follows directly from Lemma 2.1.
We will now show that x* is also independent of both u, and k when y* > for all i.
Since y* > for all i, we know from Proposition 2.1-c that x* > for all i. Therefore, I\ = 0.
From (16), we have \n(cr / Xk) = B\ /{kYlieh l/a')- Substituting this into (13) yields
x; = Bx y*) , (19)
which is independent of both k and v
t
.
Part b more accurately establishes that x" is conditionally independent of V{. Player
Y's allocations depend upon each of the Ut's. If the values of the alternatives are such that
Player Y allocates positive effort to each of them, Player X follows suit. Part b establishes
the interesting fact that the apportionment of B\ that is made to the ith alternative is
based solely on the relative size of 1/a,. The least effective alternative receives the highest
allocation. Although Player X seeks to maximize YH=\ viPi(xi->yi)i the optimal strategy is
defensive in character: if all of the alternatives are worth fighting for, effort is allocated only
on the basis of its relative effectiveness.
The other interesting feature of this result is the fact if that both competitors find it in
their best interests to compete over all of the alternatives, the proportionality of effectiveness
k does not influence either player's allocations.
It is straightforward to show by numerical example that when y* = or when x* > 0,
y* > 0, and I\ ^ 0, x* can depend upon k. Figures 1 and 2 depict optimal allocations to
alternative 1 when n = 2, B\ = 10, By = 5, a\ = a 2 = 0.4, vi = 100, and v2 = 500 when
11
k = 10 and k = 0.1, respectively. The optimal allocations for alternative 2 are simply each
player's budget value less their optimal allocation to alternative 1. Note what happens when
ai is low. Suppose, for example, that a\ = 0.10. Then x\ = when k = 10 but is positive
when k = 0.10. Here is a case where £2 > 0, y^ > 0, but I\^§ (i.e., y\ = 0) and x* depends
on k for i = 1,2. The optimal allocations are identical for both values of k when all of the
alternatives have positive allocations. This occurs when ot\ > 0.27, approximately.
The next results indicate the impact that changes in the effectiveness parameter of a
single alternative has on both competitors' allocations.
For convenience, let y,-(a,-) and x,-(q,-) denote the optimal allocations made by Players X
and Y, respectively, when the level of effectiveness is a,-. The next result establishes the fact
that if it is optimal for Player Y to allocate effort to the 2-th alternative for some level of
effectiveness, then it is optimal to allocate effort to that alternative for any higher level of
effectiveness. Since Player X allocates effort to all alternatives that Player Y allocates effort,
the same result holds for Player X.
Proposition 2.4 Assume that y,(a*) > for some i, where oc{ = a*. Then y,(a,) > and
Xi(ai) > for all a, > a*.
Proof Let hi&i) and cr(a,) denote the dependence of the index set I2 and cr on q : , re-
spectively. The hypothesis that yi(oc') > ensures that a'V{ > cr(a'), so that i G ^{ci*).
Suppose that for some a, > a*, a,i\ < cr(a,), so that i $ I2. We now show that this cannot
occur: a*u, > cr(a*) is equivalent to
H<*>i) E — > E —ln(<w)--Br-
J€/2K) aJ j€/2«) aJ
Subtracting ln(a*t>,)/a* from both sides and simplifying, yields:
\n{a
t
v
x ) =
—'- j
. (20)
Let K denote the right-hand-side of (20). Note that K is independent of a,. Since ln(a,) is
an increasing function of a 2 , ln(a,) > K for a, > a", so that i remains in I2 and y*(oci) > 0.
D
The next result states that if the Y-player allocates effort to the i-th alternative when
the level of effectiveness a*", then the X-player's effort is nonincreasing in a; on [a*, 00).
12
Proposition 2.5 Assume that for effectiveness level a*
,
yi{a*) > for all i. Then x,-(at-)
is nonincreasing on the interval [a*,oc); i.e., for any a* < a[ < a." , x*(a[) > x*(ct").
Proof Since yi(a*) > 0, i G h and y l {cx l ) > for all a, > a* by Proposition 2.4. That
Xi(cti) > decreases on [a*,oo) follows directly from (19).
Note that the condition that y{a*) > for all i is necessary. Figure 2 illustrates that Xi(cti)
can increase in a, if y, =0.
2.3 Generality of the Procedure
An analogous version of the Proportional Effectiveness Algorithm can be used to compute
the saddle point for each of the games when pi(xi,yi) has one the forms (5)-(7). There are
two features that these models share that facilitate this type of analysis. First, the form of
the payoff function in each of the three cases is such that the first-order conditions associated
with allocations made by each player to the ith alternative can be solved explicitly so that
x* and y* are expressed only in terms of the Lagrange multipliers and parameters of the
problem; i.e., the form of the payoff function makes it straightforward to simultaneously
solve
d{viPi{xi,yi))
0x
t
d(vipi(xi,yi))
= A
= lldy t
for x* and y* in terms of A, //, and the parameters of the problem. While the examples given
here involve exponential functions, the procedure is in principle generalizable to any payoff
function that possesses this separability property. An example of a non-exponential payoff
function that has this property is given in the next section.
The second feature of these models is that set of alternatives that receive positive al-
locations by either one or both players can be partitioned on the basis of the Lagrange
multipliers and parameters of the problem. This feature allows a systematic determination
of the multipliers and therefore the saddle point.
Another form of finite allocation game is now examined. This game shares the first
property discussed above but not the second. Equilibrium solutions can still be determined
in closed form for some versions of the problem, however.
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3 Market Share Attraction Games
A competitive effort allocation model that appears extensively in the economics, management
science, and marketing literature is the market share attraction model. See, for example,
Schmalensee [20], Shapley and Shubik [21], Case [5, Chapter 4], Ponssard [16, Chapter 3],
Shakun [22], Monahan [13], and Monahan and Sobel [14]. In attraction models, a market of
a fixed size is partitioned among a number of competitors on the basis of the relative size
of the "effective" effort expended by each competitor. When there are two competitors, the
share of the market accruing to one competitor has the form
"my effective effort"
"my effective effort" + "your effective effort"
In a marketing context, the n alternatives of the general model corresponds to n product
markets. The effective effort resulting from an allocation of x
z
units of effort by Player X
can be thought of as the effectiveness of an advertising campaign directed at product i that
costs $#,. The result of this effort allocation is an "attraction" of a{x]' . The parameter 7,- is
the attraction elasticity of effort, which is a measure of the responsiveness of sales (in this
case) to effort and is defined as
__
d(fcx?) Xj
dx{ /3i x]*
(Here d(f(x))/dx represents the derivative of /(•) with respect to x.) The effectiveness of
effort resulting in t/ t units allocated by Player Y is ctiy- 1 . The proportion of the z'th market
(i.e., the "market share") accruing to Player Y is
" (-">
" ferffe)
'
(21)
The share of the ith market accruing to Player X is the residual of that going to Player Y,
namely 1 - pi{xi,y t ).
As in the missile-defense model, suppose that a single budget constraint is the only
restriction on the effort allocations made by each player. The problem then, is the same
as (3) and (4), with p,(:r t , t/,) given by (21). This is a special case of a model analyzed by
Monahan [13]. (Here we assume for simplicity that the parameters Mx and m 4 in [13] are
equal to 1 for all i.) The solution to this problem is computable in closed-form: let (X*, Y*)
denote the saddle point on Z. Then
x- = Bx
—f^- and y- = BY-^—, (22)
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where
Ti = viliai0ip'"/(l3i + aip'1/i )
2
(23)
and p = By I Bx- See Monahan [13] for details regarding the derivation of this solution, as
well as extensions of the model that include the determination of optimal budgets.
Monahan and Sobel [14] study a dynamic, stochastic version of the market share attrac-
tion game specified by (3) and (4). They formulate a sequential game whose (discounted)
equilibrium point corresponds to the equilibrium point of a static (one-period) game that is
analogous to (3), where p, has the market share attraction form given in (21). Thus, the
equilibrium point of the dynamic stochastic game can also be determined in closed-form.
3.1 Comparing Qualitative Characteristics
We now make comparisons between certain characteristics of optimal allocations in the
market share model and in the missile-defense problem.
Suppose, as we did in Section 2.1, that the effectiveness of effort between Player X and
Player Y are proportional; i.e., suppose that a, = k(3{ for all i. Then, the expression for T,
given in (23) simplifies to:
(l + k/fny
{
'
When the elasticity parameter is the same across markets, i.e., 71 = . . . 7„ = 7, (24) simplifies
even further to
T
'
= ffr? (25)
We use these observations, in conjunction with (22), to characterize the dependence of the
competitive allocations on the effectiveness of effort parameter.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that a, = k3
x for all i.
a. Competitive effort allocations are independent of market specific effectiveness-only rel-
ative effectiveness, which is the same across markets, matters; i.e., x* and y* are
independent of /?, and cti but do depend upon k, which is the same for all i.
b. When 71 = . . . == "yn = 7, competitive effort allocations are independent of all measures
of effort effectiveness; i.e., x* and y* are not only independent of a x and fii, they are
independent of k for all i.
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When the effectiveness parameters are proportional in the market share model, it is
not surprising that the solution depends on neither a, nor /?,-. It is somewhat surprising,
however, to see that the equilibrium effort allocations do not depend upon k when the
elasticity measures in both markets are the same. (Since there is no counterpart to the
attraction elasticity parameter in the missile-defense model, the assumption that 7, = 7
for all i seems reasonable when comparing the solutions to the two models.) Part (b) is,
therefore, much in the spirit of Proposition 2.3. When inter-market differences are permitted
in Part (a), equilibrium allocations are sensitive to the value of k and the direction of the
reaction to changes in k depend on the relative size of each competitor's budget.
The next result indicates how k influences competitive allocations in the market share
model. For simplicity, we only consider the case where there are two markets.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that n = 2. //7, < 73-;, i = 1,2, then x* and y~ are increasing
(decreasing) in k if p > (<)1.
Proof Since the dependence of x* and y* on k are identical, we establish the result only for
x*. From (22), x* = BxTi/(Ti + J-j-,), for i = 1,2. Let T'
x
denote the derivative of T
t
with
respect to k. Then
d(vaip»/(i + V) 2 )
T! =
dk
-2v,-7,/>2'*
=
-2^/(1 + *,*). (26)
Using (22),
dx*
dk
= B,
T3-jT! - Tt Tj_ t
{Ti + r3_ ( ) 2
Substituting (26) into this expression yields,
dxf
Sign
dk
S\gn(Bx [-27^3-4^7(1 + V) - />73"7(1 +V3 -)]])
p"' ( 1 + kpi*-* ) - p
73
- ( 1 + kp1 '
)
(1 + &/^)(l +V3-)= Sign I -2BxTtT3. t
= Sign (/^3- - p™) ,
which, under the hypothesis that 7, < 73-,, is < (>)0 if p < (>)1. n
Note also that since n = 2 and each competitor always uses up its entire budget, if x* is
increasing (decreasing) in &, then x^_
t
is decreasing (increasing) in k.
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4 The General Saddle Point Problem
The determination of a closed-form solution to the market share attraction game depends
critically on the requirement that the attraction elasticities in each market (7,) are the same
for both competitors. If this condition does not hold, a different solution technique is needed.
We conclude with a brief discussion of the general problem of finding saddle points on Z.
The saddle point problem can be formulated as the optimization of an extremal-value
function. For X G fix, let
<t>(X)= min F(X,Y). (27)
The problem of finding a saddle point on Z is equivalent to maximizing the extremal-value
function 0(X) on fix', i-e.,
max 0(X). (28)
Hogan [12] studies the optimization and structure of extremal-value functions, which
include (28) as a special case. The saddle point problem can be restated in other equivalent
forms. Rosen [18], for example, considers the more general problem of solving n-person
concave games that also include (28) as a special case.
A gradient projection algorithm proposed by Rosen [18] (who formulated a dynamic,
continuous-time version of the model), Dem'yanov [10], and Dem'yanov and Pevnyi [9] can
be used to solve the general saddle point problem. The details of the algorithm are beyond
the scope of this paper. The procedure is highly computationally intensive and computes
solutions that are only guaranteed to be within a prescribed distance of the saddle point,
(i.e., the algorithm does not guarantee that it will determine the exact saddle point in a
finite number of iterations.)
5 Summary
This paper reviewed several techniques for computing saddle points of continuous, concave-
convex functions defined on polyhedra. Fast and efficient algorithms that exploit special
properties of the payoff functions in two widely-studied applications were presented. Refer-
ences are given to less efficient procedures for determining (approximate) saddle points for
the general problem. Several results relating the dependence of equilibrium allocations on
the values of certain parameters in the models were also established.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium allocations as a function of ol\ when k = 10.
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